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Bakke: Equity or Equality? - An Ethical View 
David P. Mc Daniels 
Campus Minister 
Alma College, Michigan 
Hard Cases Make Bad Law 
Law and ethics are like art o Each consists of 
drawing fine lines of distinction which form and in-
form conflicting claims, describing, inscribing, pre -
scribing. Both are subject to the judgment made of 
art: there is good and bad art. What good art con-
sists of differs from the casual observer to the con-
noisseur, each balancing perception and preference in 
judgments referred to as taste . For the layperson, 
good art is often limited to the clear , the distinct, 
often simple , easily recognizable, to the whole range 
of undifferentiated reactions and responses which 
elicit "it feels good" or "I like it o" The connois-
seur, on the other hand, may be more inclined to view 
particulars and not just "the whole picture," to con-
sider tension as well as resolve, complexity as well 
as simplicity, shadin g as well as clarity and is more 
likely to be able to say why the work of art is pleas-
ing. 
The Supreme Court's decision in the Bakke case--
as art--offers something for everyone in terms of both 
law and ethics o The "taste" of the lai ty--whether pro 
Bakke or pro affirmative action--was sated . A deci-
sion was achieved; Bakke was admitted and affirmative 
action was upheld, though the hope for~arity never 
emerged . There is enough complexity, confusion and 
tension involved in the case to keep the connoisseur 
busy for a long time and to allow for the justifica-
tion of particular "taste." 
At some point the analogy between art, law and 
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ethics and the distinction between laity and profes-
sional cease. The issue involved in Bakke is "taste," 
whether simple or sophisticated, and taste is the com-
plex of perceptions and preferences, individual and 
social values which, by definition, cannot be neutral. 
Law and ethics, in making distinctions, in forming 
judgments, reflect "taste" and are not value neutral. 
The problem before us is how we resolve primary 
value conflicts. In a pluralistic society composed of 
competing perceptions and preferences, we seem in-
creasingly to be looking to the law to resolve con-
flict. To the extent that we do this, "hard cases 
make bad law" and Bakke is unsatisfying because noth-
ing having the weight of law has been resolved. How-
ever, this same tension does, I will argue, provide 
the framework for ethics in a pluralistic society o 
In the plethora of writings on the Bakke case, 
the presentation of the facts of fhe case and the ju-
dicial opinions are in agreement. Consideration of 
the ethical issues and the possible conclusions to be 
drawn from these follow o 
Hard Cases 
Allan Bakke is a white male who was graduated 
from the University of Minnesota in 1962 with a bache-
lors degree in engineering. In 1970, he completed a 
masters degree in engineering at Stanford and in the 
next two years completed the prerequisite courses for 
medical school. In 1972, he completed two applications 
to medical school, both being rejected o In 1973, 11 
medical schools rejected his application. In 1974, 
the University of California at Davis rejected Bakke 
for the second time, even though his grade point aver-
age and MCAT scores were higher than most or all of 
the 16 minority applicants who were accepted. 
The 16 minority student acceptances at Davis were 
part of a separately administered admissions program 
for disadvantaged applicants, the Task Force Program. 
Regular applications were administered according to a 
complex formula of GPA, MCAT, interviews and some 
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preferences based on geography or other factors; 84 
seats were available in this program. 
When Bakke was denied admission to Davis for the 
second time, he sued in the California state courts, 
alleging violation of the equal protection clause of 
the 14th Amendment, a similar provision in the Cali-
fornia Constitution and Title VI of Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, arguing that because he was not elligible for 
all 100 seats, his civil rights had been violated . 
The trial court upheld Bakke's claim on all three 
grounds , yet made his admission to Davis contingent on 
his own proof that he would have been admitted had it 
not been for the set-aside program. Upon Bakke's ap-
peal to the California Supreme Court, the Davis pro-
gram was found to be invalid as a violation of the 
14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, but neither 
Title VI nor the state provision were referred to. 
Significantly, in the trial court opinion, Bakke had 
to prove that he would have been admitted were it not 
for the set-aside, whereas the State Supreme Court 
shifted the burden of proof to Davis; i.e., the Uni-
versity had to prove that he would not have been ad-
mitted in the absence of the Task Force Program . Davis 
could not comply and was ordered to admit Bakke. 
The University of Ca lifornia at Davis appealed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court and the order to admit Bakke 
was stayed when the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to re-
view the case in February 1977, The Supreme Court's 
decision to grant certiorari was important, had it re-
fused to hear the case, the California decision would 
have stood, threatening all affirmative action pro -
grams o The case was heard in October 1977, with the 
Court delaying a decision pending additional briefs 
on the applicability of Title VI o 
While awaiting the next hearing of the case, the 
Supreme Court received more than SO briefs amicus 
curiae, including the brief filed by the United States 
in qualified support of Davis, The U.S. brief argued 
that it is permissible to have minority-sensitive ad-
missions programs, but said that the record in this 
case was not clear enough to establish whether the 
Davis program met or transgressed the permissible, 
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The Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
June 1978, 
o Make Bad Law 
Only two paragraphs written by Justice Powell 
constitute the full Bakke decision o All else is of 
minority opinion and had no force of law and had little 
value for setting precedent o While Powell's short 
opinion determines the majority position, it should be 
noted that each paragraph of his opinion is supported 
by a non-overlapping group of four justices. On paper, 
the Supreme Court opinion appears to be four to four 
with one justice (Powell) agreeing with portions of 
each side (4-1-4), though technically the decision is 
5-4 0 In addition to Powell's two paragraphs, the 
court action consists of ten pages of factual back-
ground information, with which only five justices 
concur! Six minority opinions were written in the 
case, each supported by from one to four justices, 
and occupying some 140 pages. 
The two guiding documents for the Court decision 
were Title VI, section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the equal protection clause of the 14th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. They re ad as fol -
lows: 
(Title VI) No person in the United States 
shall, on the grounds of race , color or 
national or igin, be excluded from parti-
cipation in, be denied the benefits of, 
or be subjected to discrimination under 
any pr ogram or activity receiving fed-
eral financial assi s tance . 
(l4th Amendment) Nor shall any s tate . . 
deny to any person within its juris dic-
tion t he equal pr ot ection of the laws . 
Presentation of Court action will follow that given by 
the American Council of ~ducation and the Association 
of American Law Schools. 
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The six opinions delivered in the case may be 
summed up in three principal opinions: (1) one by 
Justice Stevens (joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices Steward and Rehnquist), (2) one by Justices 
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun (with the latter 
three writing separate opinions) and (3) the majority 
opinion of Justice Powell. 
(1) The Stevens group, following a long tradi-
tion of the Court to settle litigation on the basis of 
statute rather than the constitution whenever possible, 
dealt with the case in light of Title VI . For this 
group there was only a single issue, i . e., whether 
Bakke should have been admitted to the Davis medical 
school, Race-conscious programs in general were not 
examined by this group; only the particulars of Allan 
Bakke's admission were viewed. Justice Stevens con-
cluded that Davis' special admissions program excluded 
Bakke from participation in its medical education be-
cause of race and that Davi s was receiving federal 
funding. "The plain language of the statute (Title 
VI) therefore, requires affirmance
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of the judgment" 
(of the California Supreme Court). 
Differing from Powell, Stevens wrote, "It is 
therefore perfectly clear that the question whether 
race can ever be used as a factor in an admissions 
decision is not an issue in this case, a~d that dis-
cussion of that issue is inappropriate." The con-
stitutional issue of the use of race in general in 
admissions was not considered. Other affirmative ac-
tion programs are not addressed beyond the particulars 
of the Davis program. Nor is there an indication as 
to which features of the Davis program were invalid. 
The Stevens opinion thus may be read nar-
rowly as applying only in the context of 
t he University 's concession t hat it could 
"not meet t he burden of proving that the 
special admissions program did not result 
in Bakke 's exclusion." 6 
(2) The Brennan group saw Title VI and the equal 
protection clause as being the same. Use of race as a 
characteristic distinguishing a person or group con-
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stitutes a "suspect classification" and as such, must 
be rigorously reviewed as to its constitutionality, 
L e., it receives "strict scrutiny." To withstand 
strict scrutiny, the use of a suspect classification 
(race) "must be proved necessary to the accomplishment 
of some permissible state objective, independent of 
racia l discrimination which i~ was the object of the 
14th Amendment to eliminate o" The method chosen to 
effect an action must also be shown to be the most 
effective and rational alternative. 
The Brennan group hel d that the demand for strict 
scrutiny could be met and race-conscious admissions 
programs would be valid if they satisfied a three-
pronged test: First, 
a s tate government may adopt race- conscious 
pr ograms if the purpos e of such programs is 
to remove the disparate racial impact its 
actions might otherwise have and if there 
i s reason to believe that the di sparate im-
pact i s itself t he product of pas t di scrim-
ination, whether its own or that of society 
at lar ge . 
Secondly, a racial admissions criterion must be "rea-
sonably used in light of the programs' objectives .. 
" Finally, race-consciousness must not be used in 
a way
8
that "stigmati zes any discrete group or indivd-
ual." 
Brennan was satisfied that the three-pronged test 
had been met o Disparate racial impact due to past 
discrimination was established on the basis of sta-
tistical data showing minority underrepresentation in 
the medical profession and pervasive racial discrim-
ination which resulted in lower academic achievement 
by minority students, The special admissions program 
(including the idea of quotas) was seen as a reason-
able affirmative effort to correct past discrimination 
as well in that it both served the programs' objec-
tives and did not stigmatize, i.e., use of race was 
limited to admission and did not involve separ ate pro-
grams once students were admitted, 
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A short quote from three justices in this group 
provides a flavor of their findings: 
Government must take race into account when 
it acts not to demean or insult any racial 
group, but to remedy disadvantages cas t on 
minorities by pas t racial prejudice, at 
leas t when appropriate findings have been 
made by judicial, legis lative or adminis-
trative bodies with competence to act in 
this area . 
Brennan 
... during the most of the past 200 years 
the Cons titution as interpreted by this 
Court did not prohibit the most ingenious 
and pervasive forms of discrimination 
against the Negro . Now, when a state acts 
to remedy the effects of that legacy of 
di scrimination, I cannot believe that this 
same Constitution stands as a barrier. 
Marshall 
In order to get beyond racism, we must 
first take account of race . There i s no 
other way . And in order to treat some 
persons equally, we must first treat them 
differently . We cannot--we dare not-- let 
the Equal Protection Clause perpetrate 
racial supremacy . 
9 Blackmun 
(3) The following two paragraphs quoted from 
Justice Powell constitute the full Bakke decision: 
For the reasons s tated in the following 
opinion, I believe that so much of the 
judgment of the California court as holds 
petitioner ' s (University of California) 
special admissions program unlawful and 
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directs that respondent (Allan Bakke ) be 
admitted t o the Medical School must be 
affirmed. For the reasons expressed in a 
separate opinion, my Brothers, THE CHIEF 
JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE STEWART, MR . JUSTICE 
REHNQUIST, and MR . JUSTICE STEVENS concur 
in this judgment . 
I also conclude for the reasons s tated in 
the following opinion that the portion of 
the ~ourt ' s judgment enjoining petitioner 
from according any consideration to race 
in its admissions process must be reversed. 
For reasons expressed in separate opinions, 
my Brothers, MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR . JUS-
TICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR . lO 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN concur in this judgment . 
I will now try to explain how we divided on this is-
sue, It may not be self-evident. 
--Powell 
The first paragraph of Powell's opinion supports 
the conclusion of the Steven's group, Le., Allan 
Bakke was discriminated against. Yet, significantly, 
he differs as to interpretation. For Stevens, any use 
of race violates Title VI in federal programs and is 
invalid. Powell's second paragraph will not all ow him 
to accept so sweeping a judgment as regards r ace-con-
scious programs, and, therefore, his judgment in sup-
port of Bakke's claim is for different reasons. For 
Powell, the special admissions program a t Davis was 
invalid, i.e., it discriminated against Bakke, because 
it established a two-track system for admission . Be-
cause Bakke could not compete for 16 seats, the pro-
gram was discriminatory. 
However, it was not the use of race-conscious ad-
missions which formed the objection. It was the set-
aside of a "quota" which excluded Bakke, Race and 
ethnic background may be taken into accoun t in the ad-
missions p rocess, a lon g with other relevant factors, 
so long as the "program treats each applicant as an 
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individual in the admissions process. 1111 That is, in 
addition to the standard quantified data in the per-
son's file, subjective factors may be taken into con-
sideration so long as this is the case for each stu-
dent . Accordingly one's race, overcoming racial ad-
versity, etc o, may be considered a "plus" for an in-
dividual (along with other widely used subjective 
criteria such as leadership ability, extra curricular 
activity, geographical preference, being a football 
player or the child of an alumnus). 
The principle of race-conscious programs was af-
firmed in Powell's second paragraph. However, again, 
he differed from the concurring justices as to ration-
ale. The Brennan group had approved Davis ' plan as 
reasonable to redress the lingering effects of past 
discrimination. In Davis' brief, four objectives were 
given in justification of race-conscious programs . 
That cited by the Brennan group was included along 
with (1) reducing the historic deficit of tradition-
ally disfavored minorities in medical schools and the 
medical profession; (2) increasing the number of phy-
sicians who will practice in communities currently 
underserved; and (3) obtaining the educational bene-
fits t~at flow from an ethnically diverse student 
body. 
Only the last reason--the advantage of ethnic di-
versity in a s tudent body--survived Justice Powell's 
scrutiny. He stated that this goal was constitution-
ally permissable, supported by 1st Amendment values 
embodied in the concept of academic freedom, and that 
for educational reasons, ethnic diversity proved a 
compelling government interest . The admissions pro -
gram and objectives of Harvard University were quoted 
at length as an example of a permissable affirmative 
action proposal. 
Interpretation and Implications 
The surface of the Bakke decision is clear: 
Bakke's claims of discrimination against him were up -
held and affirmative action in forms other than the 
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quota system were validated. Beyond this, due to the 
complexity of the three group decision, compounded by 
six written opinions, with the conflict presented by 
opinions agreeing in principle or conclusion but dis-
agreeing in rationale or method, more questions are 
raised than answers given o Little by way of direction 
is added o There is no certainty that a look-alike 
case will be decided in the same way. 
The Stevens group did not deal with the constitu-
tional issue of the use of race as a classification. 
In its specific reference to the Davis program relating 
to Bakke, nothing was said about other forms of af-
firmative action. Even its use of Title VI is ques-
tioned; heretofore the statute had not been used to 
defend individuals against discrimination in a feder-
ally funded project but rather was used by the govern-
ment (HEW) against programs which were discriminatory. 
Whether the other justices in another suit would use 
Title VI in this manner is unsettled. Further, no in-
dication is given as to what a valid program of af-
firmative action might consist of, nor is any mention 
made of private non-federally supported affirmative 
action programs. 
The Brennan group would allow the use of quotas 
to remedy areas shown to have been discriminatory in 
the past. Yet no advice is given as to how discrimina-
tion is determined, and, by inference from minority 
opinions, this redress only applies to the suspect 
classification of race and not sex or ethnic origin. 
That affirmative action is used to make up for past 
discrimination poses a constitutional problem: when 
has due consideration for the past been made? 
Powell tips the scale from side to side. He 
agrees that a constitutional issue is involved; that 
Bakke was discriminated against (though for reasons 
different from Stevens); that affirmative action and 
the use of race is permissable (though differing from 
Brennan in the use of quotas and with respect to com-
pensation for past discrimination). However, Powell 
examines no affirmative action programs other than 
Davis and Harvard, and there are many. He doesn't say 
whether the four reasons given by Davis in support of 
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special admissions might be valid in another program. 
Indeed, he allows room for making up for past discrim-
ination if a proper body (legislative or judicial) 
judges a program to have been discriminatory in the 
past, thereby creating the possibility that a state 
legislature could mandate affirmative action even in a 
federally funded program and perhaps according to a 
quota o How and to what extent race may be used as a 
plus in admissions is left to the good will of the in-
stitution o What other relevant data may be used in 
admissions , how and to what extent can this data be 
used and how is that data to be evaluated? These are 
major questions which remain unanswered . 
The strengths of the Court decision are: (1) it 
resolved doubts about race-conscious admissions pro-
grams . Five justices viewed it as permissible while 
the Stevens group did not speak to the issue. One 
track systems, utilizing race as one factor among 
others, are permissible on an individual basis; (2) it 
meets general approval in an emotion laden subject--
each side may claim some support from the decision and 
each may lay claim to "victory"; (3) the question as 
to how and how much race can be taken into account is 
left to each educational community; affirmative action 
is neither mandated nor required--it is allowed. 
While a ll positions advanced by the Justices have 
substantial historical /phi losophical/jurisprudential 
precedent, none is clearly mandated by the Constitu-
tion. Many unresolved constitutional/philosophical 
questions remain. 
(1) Is the Constitution "color blind"? Does it 
read civil rights cases from the Reconstruction Act, 
to Plessy vs o Ferguson, to Brown vs. Board of Educa-
tion, to Sweat vs o Painter, to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 to be moving in the direction of "color blindness," 
i.e o, "all men are created equal," or are these to be 
read as supportive of affirmative action? 
(2) Does the Constitution condemn discrimination 
per se, or does it just condemn invidious discrimina-
tion? 
so 
(3) How does the Constitution resolve the con-
flict between individual rights and the social good? 
Is one's approach to the Constitution to be that of a 
hired gun (charged to defend the client) or that of a 
social engineer (setting matters of social, political, 
moral policy)? 
(4) Is the Constitution a value or an end in it-
self or does it point towards values that go beyond 
the letter of the law? How does it resolve a conflict 
of basic values when either could be validated con-
stitutionally? 
These philosophical questions are fundamental to 
resolving the Constitutional questions posed by af-
firmative action. The Supreme Court's opinion in 
Bakke presents no clear majority opinion useable for 
guidance of specific affirmative action proposals, 
nor does it answer the philosophical questions about 
the use of the Constitution. 
Hard Cases Make Bad Law 
To the extent that we expect law to refine, de-
fine, clarify, to set precedent and to mandate policy 
and action, the decision in Bakke makes for bad law . 
Yet, DID WE REALLY WANT LAW TO BE ESTABLISHED IN THIS 
CASE? I think NOT . The Court's lack of decisiveness 
created a climate of tension in which justice may be 
pursued at all levels, where policy can be further 
explored and where the burden of addressing r ace, sex, 
ethnicity and other suspect classifications is not 
lifted from our shoulders, but responsibility for it 
is laid upon individuals and institutions and each is 
to be held accountable in the public forum " 
At this point, the known has been stated: the 
facts have been recalled, the constitutional and 
statutory guides set out, the courts' opinions have 
been spelled out. What conclusions are possible have 
been stated, questions needing to be raised have been 
asked. 
What is left is AMBIGUITY, LOOPHOLES . From this 
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point on, we are back to the issue of "taste"--percep-
tion and preference a The "scholarly" juggling act is 
set in motion. Each successive writer will find ways 
(on paper) to justify taste and support it with pre-
cedent, pending the next court action; and that brings 
us to ethics. 
Ethics: Individualism and Free Enterprise 
Taste, as percept i on and preference, is going to 
dictate the words we use. While one will talk of re-
verse discrimination, bias, preference, quotas and 
equality, the other will speak of reversing discrimina-
tion, race-consciousness, minority-sensitive, goals 
and timetables and equity. Language betrays taste. 
The fundamental issue emerges: individualism and free 
enterprise confront group or social consciousness and 
affirmative action. 
What was on trial in Bakke are two modes of being 
or acting in society--concern for the individual in 
tension with the demand for social justice. On trial 
is affirmative action, redress for discrimination, ad-
vantage created for one classification of people to 
the disadvantage of another a On trial, also, are two 
fundamental American values, individualism and free 
enterprise--the rights accorded to an individual who 
is afforded social, political, economic and educational 
mobility through merit. 
From the position of ethics, I want to argue the 
case for social justice. To do so, I need to talk 
about individualism and merit. Bakke's suit against 
the Regents of California rests on both. Bakke--as an 
individual--was denied admission because of a program 
designed C in the eyes of Davis) for social good. Re-
garding merit, Bakke was more qualified for admission 
than at least some of the 16 minority students, though 
it is not often pointed out that 36 white students ad-
mitted had lower quantitative admissions scores. 
If access to higher education and, in turn, to 
professional practice were based on equality of all 
applicants and merit, minority positions in higher 
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education would be few and far between. Based on ob-
jective quantifiable merit--GPA, MCAT, LSAT--minor i ty 
scores are significantly lower nationally than whites, 
blacks scoring an average of 100 points lr3s on the 
LSAT and 102-127 points less on the MCAT. If these 
were the benchmark criteria for admission, few minority 
students would be competitive applicants o What do 
these meritocratic indices tell us? They tell us tha t 
academic performance of non-minority students was 
higher in the past; that as predictors, merit scores 
are reasonably successful in assessing potential per-
formance o They do not tell us that the 100+ points is 
below the minimum advised, Totally unqualified stu-
dents are not admitted to schools of medicine and law, 
Nor do the indices predict failure--only 2 percent of 
black students flunked out of professional schools 
during the last ten years. Most importantly, merit 
doesn't tell us anything about innate ability (only 
current performance), or about drive , motivation, per-
sistence or predict professional sy~cess o Nor can it 
measure without substantial error. 
While I would not question the utility of quanti-
fied measurement in admissions, I would seriously ques-
tion an overly heavy reliance. If admissions were 
based solely on merit, only 40 percent of the blacks 
and 60 p15cent of the Chicanos would have been admitted in 1976 . If people are to be afforded the dignity, 
integrity and value we say they are worth, then there . 
is a need to go beyond meritocracy in admissions 16to discover reliable ways to assessing "soft data," a 
fact known to ETS. Even with a ffirmative action pro-
grams, minority enrollment in medical schools is only 
8 percent today, 4 perc1~t less than the AAMC goal of 12 percent set in 1970 , 
The ethical perspective must question what seems 
to be an unwritten operational assumption, i.e., only 
numerical indices such as grades and standardi zed tests 
can measure quality, p8rit, individua l worth or poten-tial for performance o Overdependence on merit merely 
covers up for lack of administrar~ve effort ration-
alized by cost-benefit analysis, When "soft data" 
is taken into account creatively and conscientiously, 
the dangers of meritocracy are avoided, especially in 
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light of the strict scrutiny of the law. 
"Soft data" allows room for equity--perhaps not 
for equality. While the language of law calls for 
equality, simple, honest observation, allows one to 
conclude that all is not equal, especially with re-
spect to admissions. Inequality, built into the very 
fabric of our past and present society prevents us 
from treating all as equals (according to merit?) or 
privilege and access to opportunity will largely re-
main with the privileged o Concern for social justice 
prevents us from using the "equality" standard. We 
may instead strive for equity, treating each individual 
as a whole person utilizing both hard and soft cri-
teria. This is to say that we can personalize oppor-
tunity o It may take some inequality to become equal 
. o O but only with respect to merit. 
Justice: Equity not Equality 
Aris to t le succumbed t o Pythagor ean in-
f luence which promiscuous ly commi ngled 
mathematics and ethics (when he said) : 
"A U Men t~bnk jus t i ce to be a sort of 
equali t y . 11 
If we can admit the present need for equity and 
not equality, then we can look forward to a more com-
plete notion of j ust~re' as the "fundamental category 
of social existence" rather than equality. Indi vi-
dualism can no longer be above, but must be alongside 
of the claims of social justice and equality broadens 
to include corrective inequality o 
Justice is tripartite--rendering minimal due in 
three respects: (1) it regulates relations between 
individuals (commutative justice); (2) it regulates 
relations between individuals and the common good 
(social justice); and (3) it regulates social 12encies in dispensing of goods (distributive justice). 
Given the tripartite notion of justice, the claims of 
the individual (eg. Bakke) take their place alongside 
of and in tension with social justice and distributive 
justice o 
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The tension created by the Sup r eme Court decision 
in Bakke and the legacy of that lit i gation create the 
form for a just society . 
Towards a Litigious Society? Justice Not Law! 
Three major methods are available for doing 
ethics: the good, the right and the fitting (corres-
ponding to teleological, deontological and situational 
ethics). Each has been used to dete rmine and justify 
action in and of itself. Each has severe limitations 
when used extensively or exclusively. Ethical rela-
tivism results from shifting from one method to an-
other on a case by case basis . Diff erent individuals 
or groups reflecting on the same issue but from dif-
ferent methods and plugging in competing values gives 
our culture the character of ethical pluralism. 
As stated in the introduction, ethical pluralism 
accounts for conflicting values and social tension. 
To ease moral, social and political tension, our cul-
ture has turned increasingly to lit i gation for ans-
wers: we have become an increasingl y litigious soc i-
ety. To do so is to confuse or bypass necessary steps 
for doing ethics in a pluralistic society. Looking at 
the three categories of ethics, the good may be seen 
as that which may legislate and enforce what is good 
for society, the right is that which forms the value 
base for litigating the good and the fitting takes 
into account the particulars of a given situation. 
When looking at a particular situation (Bakke) 
while expecting the courts to determine policy (the 
good), w~ lose sight of the right (justice in the tri-
partite sense as the basis of law). The litigious 
society repl aces the values of the right with the pro-
cess of determining the good . Law becomes equated 
with justice, the Constitution (which binds the Court) 
becomes the value itself. The appropriate ethical 
method for our day is to maintain t he full tension 
between the right (justice) and the particular s i tua-
tion (the fitting). Within this tension, the struggle 
for the good (the law) is not an answer, but a media-
ting part of the process . 
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The right is not carved unambiguously in stone, 
The situation changes by the moment. The law (Con-
stitution) cannot be rigid and inflexible in mediating 
the tension. From the ethical point of view, Bakke 
was handled correctly o The principle of justice was 
applied to a particular situation without becoming 
cannonized in law o 
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